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China’s Fight against HIV/AIDS 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over 40 million people worldwide were infected with the Human Immunodeﬁciency 
Virus (HIV) in 2005.1 China’s prevalence rate of about 0.07% of the population is 
low in comparison with Sub-Saharan Africa. This is of course deceptive, given 
China’s 1.3 billion population. Latest official estimates calculate that there were 
650,000 ‘people currently living with HIV/AIDS in China’ in 2005.2 Of these, 75,000 
had contracted AIDS. There were 70,000 new HIV infections and 25,000 people died 
of AIDS in 2005. Given problems of monitoring and of stigma, actual numbers may 
be much greater3. The discrepancy is attributable to reporting weaknesses reflecting 
the continuing power of stigma and to previous administrative delay and obstruction. 
Some reports suggest there are 1 million HIV-positive people in Henan Province 
alone. 4
                                                 
1 UNAIDS, UNAIDS Update 2005 (Geneva: UNAIDS, December 1, 2005). 
 UNAIDS representatives described official figures as only the ‘tip of the 
2 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office, UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, and 
World Health Organization, 2005 Update on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic and Response in China (Beijing: 
National Center for AIDS/STD Prevention and Control, China CDC, January 24, 2006), p.1; State 
Council AIDS Working Committee Office/UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, A Joint 
Assessment of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Care in China (2004) (Beijing: State Council 
AIDS Working Committee Office, December 1, 2004).  
3 Author interviews, Dr. Jinglin He, National Program Officer, UNAIDS China, Beijing, March 2004; 
Professor Zhao Peng-Fei, HIV/AIDS/STI Coordinator, World Health Organization, Beijing, March 
2004. 
4 Jonathan Watts, ‘Hidden from the world, a village dies of Aids while China refuses to face a growing 
crisis’, The Guardian Online, 25 October, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
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iceberg’ and anticipated over 10 million sufferers by 2010.5
   This paper argues that, for continued improvement in its fight against HIV/AIDS, 
China needs to sustain the epidemiological focus whilst increasing the emphasis upon 
the non-epidemiological factors contributing to the spread of the disease. The fight is 
intimately entwined with the management of a country in profound economic and 
social transition. The power of HIV/AIDS in China is driven by the greater porosity 
of the country’s borders encouraging the flow of migration, human and narcotics 
trafficking bringing with them deadly disease along burgeoning trade routes. Behind 
the aggregate statistics of rising national affluence, the economics of rapid structural 
adjustment has produced income inequalities, poverty gaps, mass domestic migration, 
and an urban-rural divide. These problems provide fertile ground for the spread of 
HIV/AIDS through illicit drug use, prostitution, and plasma sales as well as 
inadequate health, insurance, and care services. Over the past five years, the Chinese 
Government and civil society has actively engaged with the principles and agencies of 
global HIV/AIDS governance
 The Chinese Government 
has pledged to keep the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS under 1.5 
million by 2010. The latest official statistics recording lower infection levels reflect 
improved monitoring but also suggest that a new political commitment is having some 
impact.  
6
                                                 
5  UNAIDS, China page, http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/china.asp; Avert, 
‘HIV/AIDS in China’, October 2003, http://www.avert.org/aidschina.htm; China Internet Information 
Centre, ‘China Has Over 1 Million HIV Carriers’, Xinhua News Agency , October 17, 2003, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/ May/33307.htm.  
. But, as a complex whole, the HIV virus intersects 
with normative regimes addressing issues that revolve around human rights, humane 
6 Author research interviews, Dr. Jinglin He, Beijing, March 2004; Professor Zhao Peng-Fei, Beijing, 
March 2004. 
 3 
governance, and human security in the widest socio-economic and political senses. 
Here humane governance is employed normatively to emphasize the importance of 
values and the purposes to which governance ought to be harnessed. In other words, 
what or who is governance for? As Falk defines it, humane security is ‘a process, 
within horizons of aspiration being continuously re-established with an eye to the 
improvement of the existing social, economic and political order from the perspective 
of a democratically established agenda.7
  This multi-sectoral character is the inescapable challenge of the pandemic and of an 
effective response. HIV/AIDS, therefore, draws in realms of societal discomfort for 
China. These include considerations of patriarchy and gendered relations, sexual 
identity, the status and role of civil society, popular disturbance, and discursive 
freedom. To examine China’s fight against HIV/AIDS is to also examine the wider 
challenges of transition facing contemporary China. The study begins by detailing and 
explaining the extent of the HIV/AIDS challenge facing China. It then traces and 
evaluates China’s response focusing upon the policies, capacity building, and funding 
at national and provincial levels. The following part of the analysis addresses issues of 
governance, civil society, and identity. The study continues with an assessment of the 
character of the relationship between global and national governance. The paper 
concludes with a return to a notion of humane governance and the implications of the 
HIV/AIDS for China’s continuing transition. 
 In the present study we take this normative 
conceptualization to explore multiple societal factors of human security contributing 
to the pandemic’s spread such as economic adjustment and wealth inequalities, drug 
use, cultural practices, gendered roles, and public discourse.  
                                                 
7 Richard Falk, ‘Humane Governance for the World: Reviving the Quest’ in Rorden Wilkinson (ed), 
The Global Governance Reader (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 105. 
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China’s HIV/AIDS Challenge 
Despite the latest lower estimate of the incidence of PLWA, HIV/AIDS is still 
developing strongly in China. The 2005 Update evaluation of China notes that ‘HIV 
has been detected in 48% of China’s counties but is observed in all 31 provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities’.8
    In China, viral transmission derives from the mutually reinforcing and 
compounding practices of: intravenous drug use (IDU); unsafe heterosexual sex; men 
who have sex with men (MSM); and to a lesser extent blood contamination and 
mother-to-child transmission (MTCT). According to the 2004 Joint Assessment IDU 
outstripped sexual transmission in 2003. However, the underlying trend through 2005 
now shows that these have reversed with more new HIV infections due to sexual 
transmission than to IDU.
 
9
   Assessments of the numbers of IDU vary. Senior Chinese Government Ministers 
stated that the official number of registered drug addicts was 1.05 million in 2004. 
Other reports put the number of addicts much higher at 3 to 4 million.
  
10
                                                 
8 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office, UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, and 
World Health Organization, 2005 Update, p.i.  
 Again, 
9 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office, UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, and 
World Health Organisation, 2005 Update, p.4. 
10 Luo Feng, PRC Vice Minister of Public Security, Press Briefing during 10th National People’s 
Congress, March 1, 2004 cited by Drew Thompson, ‘The “People’s War” against Drugs and 
HIV/AIDS’, China Brief (The Jamestown Foundation) Vol.5(14), (21 June, 2005), p.1; see also: Rik 
Asplund and Anjelica Mamtova, Country Factsheets, Eurasian Narcotics: China 2004 (Uppsala: Joint 
Project on Narcotics, Organized Crime and Security in Eurasia, Silk Road Program/Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute Johns Hopkins-SAIS, 2004), p.1, http://www.silkroadstudies.org; Drew Thompson, 
Injecting Drug Use Fuelling Spread of HIV in China (Washington DC: Population Reference Bureau, 
 5 
according to the 2005 Joint Assessment Update, there were 288,000 people living 
with HIV/AIDS who were also IDUs. This accounted for almost half of all HIV/AIDS 
cases. Reported HIV/AIDS infection amongst drug injectors covers all Chinese 
provinces and regions. However, the worst affected provinces are: Yunnan, Xinjiang, 
Guangxi, Guangdong, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Beijing. The rate of 
HIV prevalence in the high-risk IDU populations in some areas of Sichuan, Guangxi, 
Guizhou reached 50%, 43% and 34% respectively. In Xinjiang and Yunnan, 
HIV/AIDS prevalence among IDUs has reportedly reached 80%.11
   According to the Yunnan Health Bureau, as of September 2005, the Province had 
17,390 HIV-positive people and another 1,118 people who had contracted AIDS. 
Yunnan Province borders the ‘Golden Triangle’ with Laos and Burma and is a long 
established area of IDU and high HIV infection. The early 1990s saw a high 
concentration of HIV infection in four counties of Dehong Prefecture in Yunnan 
Province with levels highest in Ruili, Longchuan, Yingjiang and Luxi. By the end of 
the decade, HIV had spread across the whole of Yunnan Province with severely high 
concentrations of 50-80% in infected resident IDU communities. Between 1987 and 
1998, Yunnan accounted for over half of all reported HIV infections. However, by the 
  
                                                                                                                                            
August 2004), http://www.prb.org; Drew Thompson, China Confronts HIV/AIDS (Washington DC: 
Population Reference Bureau,, 2005); Country Coordinating Mechanism: China, ‘Round 4 Proposal: 
Reducing HIV Transmission among and from vulnerable groups and alleviating its impact in seven 
provinces in China’ (Geneva: The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, June 1, 2005), p.2, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/search/docs/4CHNH_781_0_su mmary.pdf; 
11  UNAIDS China Office, Country Profile: China, Beijing, 2000; State Council AIDS Working 
Committee Office, UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, and World Health Organization, 2005 
Update, p.1; p.4. 
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end of the decade IDU was a declining cause of HIV infection in relation to other 
forms of transmission; falling from 87% of cases in 1987 to 75% in 1998. 
   As drug use and the sharing of needles increased in other provinces/regions such as 
Xinjiang and Guangxi, there has been a corresponding increase in IDU-related HIV 
infection and AIDS deaths across the country. Geography is important here in 
explaining the spread of infection tied to drugs. The path of HIV/AIDS in China 
follows the routes of Asia’s drugs traffickers, commercial traders, and migrants: 
‘Overland routes involve local people, highways, local traders and, sadly, have led to 
this burgeoning AIDS epidemic for India, China and Vietnam.’12
   Up to 1998, Xinjiang accounted for 37% of all reported HIV infections. These were 
found principally within the majority Uyghur population with over 85% of HIV 
infections and in the urban centers with over 94% of infections to be found in the two 
cities of Urumqi and Yining and with a particularly strong IDU infection rate of 85% 
in Yining as early as 1999 (over twice that of Urumqi). In Guangxi, IDU remains the 
primary source of HIV infections; particularly along the region’s borders with 
Vietnam and Yunnan. Sichuan evidences HIV prevalence among the Yi peoples of 
Liangshan Prefecture astride the major IDU Burma-China narcotics route. Finally, in 
Guangdong, surveys demonstrate significant rates of IDU HIV infection and with 
high levels of injection and needle sharing, intensifying the spread of the HIV virus.
  
13
   The second major mode of transmission is that of sexual contact: heterosexual and 
MSM. With sexually transmitted disease (STD) rates growing annually and the 
growing number of sex workers in China’s burgeoning sex industry, the potential for 
a growing exposure to the HIV virus is growing rapidly.  
 
                                                 
12 Susan Okie, ‘AIDS outbreaks follow Asia’s Heroin Traffic’, The Washington Post, March 6, 2000, 
p.A9. 
13 UNAIDS China Office, Country Profile: China, Beijing, 2000. 
 7 
   With regard to the sex industry, the transmission of STDs and HIV/AIDS to women 
is facilitated by a shift in the character of the industry. For many women and girls, 
human trafficking and criminal exploitation and abuse force them into prostitution. 
For those women and girls for whom there is some element of non-criminalized 
involvement in the sex industry, the ‘choice’ of working in this sector is driven by the 
imperatives of economic need. However, commercial sex work is said to be changing 
from being ‘direct’ and ‘full time’ to ‘indirect’ and ‘part time’ in nature. As the 2001 
World Health Organization (WHO) Report Sex Work in Asia notes, indirect 
commercial sex now takes place in private accommodation, usually suburban, with 
sex workers available by mobile phone and to travel to clients. According to this 
report, sex workers are increasingly involved in the industry as part-timers with 
students or home workers seeking added income. These workers do not see 
themselves as sex workers or at a high risk of HIV/AIDS infection and often do not 
use condoms.14
   The issue of condoms has been a long-running concern with official attitudes 
moving from one end of the spectrum of acceptance to the other. Hence, although 
public condom-vending machines were introduced to strong popular appeal in 
Shenzhen in 1998, the following year saw the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce ban the first television advertisement promoting the use of condoms to 
prevent the spread of HIV. By 2001, however, a number of provinces were piloting 
programs to promote 100% condom use and from these beginnings a national 
promotional and educational effort has developed. Greater availability and acceptance 
of condoms has emerged as a result of central and provincial government 
encouragement, collaborative initiatives by international agencies, and action by 
  
                                                 
14 WHO, Sex Work in Asia, WHO Western Pacific Region, 2001. 
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Chinese businesses and the voluntary sector. Yet problems persist. Whilst more 
people have heard about HIV/AIDS, the prevention message appears to be slow to 
permeate some communities. Thus, a 2004 survey conducted across a spectrum of 
communities found that 17% of urbanites, 11.4% of small town residents, and only 
5.8% of villagers knew that condoms help prevent HIV transmission. 15  The 
persistence of entrenched gendered attitudes toward manly virility and the subordinate 
status of women contribute to HIV transmission. Moreover, condom use among sex 
workers and their clients remains low. Some studies indicated that 10% of sex 
workers claimed they always use condoms whilst almost 50% admitted that they 
never used condoms. This problem is compounded by the criminalized status of sex 
work and reports that sex workers do not carry condoms because, in some police 
jurisdictions, possession is considered evidence of illegal prostitution.16 Finally, the 
pay of sex workers is low and, according to one observer, they are reluctant to spend 
their limited funds on condoms.17
   One further factor is that of so-called ‘blood security’
 
18
                                                 
15 Horizon and Futures Group Europe Survey reported in Xinhua News Agency, ‘Few Chinese Well 
Informed about AIDS: Survey’, August 9 , 2004, http://www.casy.org/chron/awareness.ht m. 
. Blood contamination has 
seriously affected tens of thousands of people in rural areas, and particularly in Henan 
Province in central China, since the early 1990s. This has largely been driven by poor 
instrument and facility sterilization practices; by corruption, ineptitude or just simply 
by the needs of health practitioners working in a severely under-resourced health care 
16 Drew Thompson, China Confronts HIV/AIDS (Washington D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 
2005), p.11 
17 Allen Anderson, ‘AIDS/HIV in China: Scrambling to defy a bleak prediction’, http://www.homepag 
es.indiana.edu/100804/text/china.shtml.  
18 UNAIDS China Office, Country Profile: China, Beijing, 2000. 
 9 
infrastructure.19 The number of blood collection centers in China grew during the 
1980s with little or no regulation. Many of these were community based and offered a 
potential commercial benefit for these communities through income-generation. But a 
key problem was that ‘blood was pooled prior to returning red cells to plasma donors’ 
thereby increasing the spread of HIV infection and the transmission of hepatitis B 
among repeat donors. 20  This situation was exacerbated by unscrupulous criminal 
middlemen and women (the so-called ‘bloodheads’ or ‘xuetou’) who exploited those 
in destitution to sell their blood to hospitals critically short of plasma.21
                                                 
19 Ling Li and Peter Yuen, ‘China’s Health Care System Reform under Globalization’ in Ding Lu, 
Guanzhang James Wen and Huizhong Zhou (eds), China’s Economic Globalization through the WTO 
(London: Ashgate, 2003), pp.101-115; China Daily, ‘Legislators Urge More Health Spending’, 9 
September 2004, http://www.app1chinadaily.com.cn/static/2004chartsale/index.html . 
 By the late 
1990s it was evident that the village communities in particular were being seriously 
affected. The reform process and economic restructuring in China had hit the rural 
population hard with the closure of state-owned enterprises and a lack of investment 
in new business sectors with a consequential rise in unemployment, under-
employment and weakened consumer demand. But it was falling farm incomes and a 
failure of state agencies to pay many farmers; the adverse impact of this income 
deficit on the local economies; a loss of population (particularly the younger 
population) to the cities and a consequential aging of the rural demographic profile 
that provided a pool of people desperate for money simply to meet their basic needs. 
20 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report of an HIV/AIDS Assessment in China 
(Washington D.C.: National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention, 2001), http:// www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/sandt/ptr/CDCAssessment-prt.htm. 
21  John Gittings, ‘The Aids scandal China could not hush up’, The Guardian, June 11, 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk; Heather Xiaoquan Zhang and Lin Gu, ‘Facing up to the AIDS challenge’, 
http://www.gbcc.org.uk/iss23health.htm. 
 10 
For their part, under-financed and under-resourced hospitals with health workers often 
unpaid for months on end were drawn into these criminal webs for ethical reasons of 
getting hold of plasma to help their patients; to meet their personal income needs; or 
for reasons of personal corruption. Criminals with little interest in, or capacity for, 
maintaining the sterile quality of the blood they were collecting and selling and poor 
training and inadequate facilities in the hospitals themselves further contributed to 
plasma contamination. In one village, Wenlou in Henan Province, one villager sold 
his blood for cash ten times earning 45 Yuan (US$5) a pint22. He was far from being 
alone. Over 65% of villagers tested positive to HIV. With 40 villagers a year dying 
from AIDS and with virtually no medical support, shunned by neighboring 
settlements, the village became a waiting room for death. In another Henan village in 
the mid-1990s, Xiongqiao, villagers were also paid 45 RMB — enough to feed a 
family for a week.23 The Chinese Government prohibited the sale of blood in 1998 
with severe penalties for transgressors and established a strict regulatory regime to 
police the ban.24
 Henan simply highlighted the underlying problems in China’s public health system. 
From 1949 to the early 1990s, China developed a modern health system capable of 
successfully tackling disease, increasing life expectancy, and reducing child mortality. 
However, during the 1990s, budgetary decline and administrative neglect undermined 
the system. Public health services are primarily the financial responsibility of 
 
                                                 
22 All US$ conversions in this paper are at mid-market rates as of 31 January 2006, http://www.xe.co 
m/ucc. 
23  Adam Brookes, ‘Bad Blood Spreads Aids in China’, The Guardian, May 30, 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk; also see Jonathan Watts, “Hidden from the world”. 
24 Ann Hwang, ‘AIDS over Asia’, The Guardian, January 16, 2001, The Guardian Unlimited, October 
25, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/weblogarticle/0, 422997,00.html. 
 11 
provincial governments. This has created significant disparities in services. In 2004, 
Li Liming (Director of the Government’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention) 
argued that the rural health system was virtually paralyzed with one-third of the 
system having collapsed; another third in the process of disintegrating; and only the 
remaining third functioning satisfactorily.25
   Each of these contributory factors is directly and indirectly tied to the experience of 
rapid and profound economic transformation in China and the social costs of 
structural adjustment carried within it. Falling agricultural production, unemployment, 
an increasing income gap and rural poverty, and a continuing imbalance between 
economic growth and social development, contribute to pressures upon effective 
health governance and to China’s fight against HIV/AIDS.
 
26  The Government 
acknowledges all these as major costs arising from high economic growth rates. A 
decision in March 2004 to try to lower the GDP target to 7% from the previous year’s 
9.1% was recognition of the dangers of the social consequences a narrow focus upon 
an unalloyed dash to growth targets.27
                                                 
25  Cited in China Daily, ‘Public health system in urgent need of overhaul’, March 4, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-03/04/content_311738.htm; Gail Henderson, 
‘Understanding the context of emerging pathogens in China’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, Vol.VII(4), 
Autumn 2003, http://www.fas.harbard.edu/~asiactr/index.htm. 
  This realization by the CCP and Government 
elites involves a policy shift towards combating the problems of unemployment; rural 
decline; massive internal migration and urbanization poverty; and long-term under-
investment in social welfare and health infrastructures.  
26  China View, ‘Report on Economic and Social Development Plan’, March 17, 2003, 
http://www.chinaview.cn. 
27  Far Eastern Economic Review, ‘The Death of “Growth at any cost”’, April 1, 2004, 
http://www.feer.com; The Economist, ‘Behind the Mask: A Survey of Business in China’, March 20, 
2004, http://www.economist.com. 
 12 
   This shift in policy emphasis is easier said than done. The problem is that slowing 
an economic juggernaut takes time and careful management and, in 2005, China was 
still recording 9.9% annual growth due to continued export growth. Registered urban 
unemployment was 4.2% in 2005 and the youth unemployment rate remained high at 
9% for those aged 15-29.28 Research by RAND’s Charles Wolf indicates that, when 
proper allowance is made for ‘disguised’ rural unemployment as well as 
‘unregistered’ urban unemployment, China’s actual unemployment rate soared in 
2003 to an estimated 23% of the total labor force.29 Urban-rural income disparities; 
intra-urban income inequalities and ‘spatial poverty gaps’ combined with 
overcapacity in some key sectors; unemployment; and 150 million internal migrants 
intensify pressures contributing to the socio-economic context for the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. In November 2005, Vice-Minister of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, Du Ying, stated that the gap between the rich and poor is 
expected to widen further. The Vice-Minister pointed to the Gini coefficient (a 
measure of inequality in which zero expresses complete equality while one represents 
complete inequality) and argued that: ‘The gauge has come close to 0.45 and showed 
a trend towards increasing further.’ He said income disparity also exists between rural 
and urban farmers, coastal areas and western inland regions.30
                                                 
28  China News, ‘Youth unemployment rate remains high’, June 25, 2005, http://www.china 
news.cn/news/2004/2005-05-25/4900.shtml; Peter Goodman, ‘China’s economy hits growth spurt’, 
Washington Post, January 26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2006/01/25/AR2006012500273.html?nav=rss_world/asia . 
  
29  Charles Wolf, ‘Commentary: China’s Rising Unemployment Challenge’ (California: RAND 
Corporation, July 2004), http://www.rand.org/commentary/070704AWSJ.html ; (The term ‘disguised’ 
unemployment refers to labor that is reported as nominally employed, but in fact does not add to 
output). 
30 Fu Jing, ‘Number of jobless may peak next year’, China Daily, November 25, 2005, p.2. 
 13 
   The deeper political issue here involves continued CCP legitimacy in its attempted 
transition to a new socio-economic structure and culture and renewed ‘patriotic’ basis 
of national identity and popular support for the Party. There is potential for the social 
tensions of structural adjustment to produce serious challenges to the authority and 
legitimacy of the Party. Government apprehension about ‘mass incidents’ has gained 
renewed force with speeches on this made by President Hu Jintao to Party leaders in 
September and December 2004. Officially, there were 87,000 mass incidents in 
2005.31 According to Zhou Yongkang (Public Security Ministry), there were 74,000 
protests in 2004; an increase from 58,000 in 2003 and 10,000 in 1994. Tsinghua 
University sociologist Sun Liping, estimates that demonstrations involving more than 
100 people took place in 337 cities and 1,955 counties in the first 10 months of 2004 
amounting to 120-250 daily urban protests and 90-160 village demonstrations.32
                                                 
31 Cited in Jonathan Watts, ‘China activists “vanish” amid protests’, The Guardian, February 25, 2006, 
p.17. 
 In 
terms of health, public discontent and overt criticism of the Government’s handling of 
the SARS and Avian Flu outbreaks forced a Governmental response designed to 
reassure the Chinese people of greater future transparency and more effective action 
in this fundamental portfolio of public policy. Yet, such attempts at reinvigorating 
public trust in public health governance were again sorely tested in August 2006 with 
the Government’s admission that it had actually recorded China’s first Avian Flu 
death some two years prior to the date it had hitherto repeatedly given.  
32  Cited in The Economist, ‘The Cauldron Boils: Protests in China’, September 29, 2005, 
http://www.economist.com/World/asia/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=4462719; see also: Murray Scot 
Tanner, Chinese Government Responses to Rising Social Unrest: Testimony to the US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission  April 14, 2005 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation CT-240, 2005), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT240/index.htm.  
 14 
   According to the UNDP in 2005: ‘China [has] succeeded in lifting 250 million 
people out of poverty over the past 25 years. However, during the same period income 
inequality has doubled. A person living in a city earns on average US$1000 a year, 
compared to just over US$300 in the countryside. An urban citizen can also expect to 
live over 5 years longer than a farmer.’ This has significant implications for access to 
health care provision — including being able to travel to HIV and AIDS treatment 
centers, gain access to HIV/AIDS, or pay for expensive ART drugs specialists. For 
example, the UNDP Report goes on to note that: ‘only 15% of rural residents had 
medical insurance in 2004, whereas half of urban population benefited from full 
insurance.’33
 
 As we shall see below, the central Government has finally moved to 
tackle this problem by more effectively extending the insurance scheme to farmers as 
well as introducing programs for the manufacture of cheaper generic ART drugs, free 
access for many to these drugs, and personal financial support to facilitate greater 
economic access to HIV/AIDS programs. 
China’s Response 
By the end of 2000, the Chinese Government was still subject to international 
criticism for disingenuous inaction over HIV/AIDS. The initial reaction had been that 
this was a foreign disease (described in 1990 as ‘爱滋病Aizibing’ — the ‘loving 
capitalism disease’). In 1987 the Vice-Minister for Health warned women against 
sexual relations with foreigners but added that AIDS was unlikely to take hold 
                                                 
33 UNDP China, Press Release: China on the watch for fighting social inequality, new UNDP report 
says (Beijing: UNDP China, December 16, 2005); UNDP China, The National Human Development 
Report for China 2005 (Beijing, UNDP, December 2005). 
 15 
because abnormal sexuality (homosexuality) was a ‘limited’ problem in China. 34 
Henceforth, foreign students would be tested and certified for entry into China. 
Presenting the HIV virus as a foreign disease and the incidence of HIV and AIDS as 
negligible, the Government’s response was displacement, prevarication and under-
commitment. But by 2001 the combination of international pressure and the mounting 
weight of evidence that China was increasingly in the grip of a major epidemic finally 
brought a ‘reality check’ (to borrow UNAIDS’ phraseology 35
 
) and official 
acknowledgement of the threat. Since then, there has been a demonstrable change in 
Government policy and action backed by international support.  
HIV/AIDS strategies 
There are two recent turning points in overcoming national and international unease 
over China’s poor response to the HIV/AIDS threat during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Firstly, 2001 proved an initial turning point in Government attitudes with various 
external and internal factors contributing to this shift. UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan raised the need for intensified AIDS prevention in China during a meeting 
with President Jiang Zemin in January 2001. Nane Annan, wife of the Secretary-
General, met with media representatives involved in the Year 2000 World AIDS 
Campaign in China and insisted on the importance of ‘breaking the silence’, noting 
that ‘silence in the area of AIDS is equivalent to death.’36
                                                 
34 Government of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Health, AIDS Newsletter —Item 531 
(Beijing: Bureau of Hygiene & Tropical Diseases, 1987). 
 This theme was reinforced 
during a joint January meeting between the UN Theme Group (UNTG) and the China 
Multisectoral AIDS Coordinating Committee. The Vice-Chair of the UNTG shared 
35 UNAIDS, Update 2005, p.8. 
36 WHO, 2001: The Year of Breaking the Silence on AIDS in China (Geneva: WHO, 2001). 
 
 16 
the Theme Group’s concern for the need of more openness and intensified fight 
against discrimination towards people living with HIV/AIDS in China. At the same 
meeting, Professor Dai Zhicheng from the China AIDS Association made a plea for 
more AIDS prevention and for more openness to deal more efficiently with the actual 
HIV situation in China, especially with regard to the paid blood donation related HIV 
epidemics in poor rural areas of Central China.  
   An attempt to establish a coordination regime and effective HIV/AIDS governance 
had been initiated in 1996 with the creation of a National AIDS Committee and a 
National Program on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control established under the 
Ministry of Health in 1987. However, the structurally inadequate and secretive 
governmental response to the SARS outbreak exposed deep-seated obstacles to 
fighting pandemic disease in China. So, the second turning point has been a new, 
more vigorous policy commitment by the central government and more robust 
delivery systems. In February 2004, the State Council AIDS Working Committee 
(SCAWC) and administrative Office (SCAWCO) were created under the State 
Council 37
   There had been increasingly vocal calls, such as that in late 2003 by Zeng Yi from 
the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, for a strengthening of the 
existing committee coordinating the state’s response to HIV/AIDS. In response, 
SCAWC was to coordinate efforts across the various government ministries with over 
24 government departments and 7 provinces represented. In June 2005, an Executive 
Meeting of the State Council, Chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao, built upon the steps 
.  
                                                 
37  ‘全国防治艾滋大会4月召开历数中国防艾19年政策之变 ’ [Policy Changes on China’s 
HIV/AIDS Prevention during the past 19 Years], 新 京 报 , Xinjing Bao, http:// 
www.hrol.org/news/info.php?id=210. 
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taken in 2004 to detail 9 areas of response, instruct all levels of government to prepare 
detailed action plans, and to prioritize HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care in 
the 11th National Five Year Plan.38
 The background for these new developments lies in a series of medium term plans 
for 1990-1993 and 1995-2000 and a Medium and Long-Term Plan for 1998-2010. 
Within this strategic context, the State Council had initially promulgated the China 
Plan of Action to Contain, Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS (2001-2005) in May 2001. 
This provided for a seven-fold increase in committed funding. It defined the working 
objectives for 2002 through to 2005 and highlighted action strategies in priority areas, 
essential resources including institutional, policy and financial needs. For instance, 
emphasis was put on guaranteeing blood safety, care and increased public awareness. 
In the area of care, by the end of 2002, at least half of people living with HIV/AIDS  
nationwide were to have had access to community and home care. Almost three-
quarters of hospitals at county/city level were to be capable of providing standardized 
services including HIV/AIDS diagnosis, treatment, counseling, prevention and care, 
while half of township health clinics were to be able to provide counseling, prevention 
and care for HIV/AIDS and STD. By the end of 2005, these figures were to have 
reached 90% for counties, 75% for townships and 50% for premarital clinics. The 
strategic plan is currently subject to evaluative review by the Government and (as at 
January 2006) its results not yet published. But the available evidence suggested that, 
by the end of 2005, it had not yet achieved many targets.  
 
   On an encouraging note, a program of support announced in December 2003 by 
Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice-Premier Wu Yi, the ‘Four Free and One Care’ [‘四免一
                                                 
38 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office, UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, and 
World Health Organization, 2005 Update, p.7. 
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关怀’政策] policy, is being steadily implemented across China. This was a major 
initiative. This intervention program aimed to provide free ARV to rural and poor 
HIV-sufferers; free counseling and testing; free drugs such as Neviropine to infected 
pregnant women to reduce MTCT and for the testing of newborn children39
 Deputies in the National People’s Congress pointed out in March 2004 that China 
still lacked a basic law on HIV/AIDS control and prevention making the various 
regulations and rules inconsistent in the way they are interpreted and applied across 
the country.
; free 
schooling for children orphaned by AIDS; and care and economic support to 
households of people living with HIV/AIDS. 
40 For example, the approach to high-risk groups such as drug users and 
sex workers can vary enormously depending upon factors such as local police 
attitudes and it is clear that, if the goal of identifying carriers is to be achieved, legal 
protection for high-risk groups is necessary to encourage their participation in 
intervention programs. The Health Ministry was seeking to respond to a situation 
where there were over 300 laws, regulations, and rules at all levels of administration 
making for confusion and outright contradiction between them.41
                                                 
39 See http://www.fic.nih.gov/programs/training_grants/aitrp/pr2003.pdf. 
 The State Council 
decided in March 2004 upon a comprehensive program of action to halt the spread of 
40  China Daily, ‘Legislator calls for law on AIDS control’, March 11, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-03/content_313868.htm. 
41  China Daily, ‘AIDS rule could help quell epidemic’, March 15, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/English/doc/2004-03/content_314733.htm. 
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HIV/AIDS and to support those who are affected by it.42
   The administrative challenges of implementing the central government’s program 
receive most policy emphasis. Consequently, local governments were required to 
develop detailed plans and to integrate them into government performance 
evaluation.
 Whilst building upon the 
earlier five-year action plan of 2001, with this new plan it appeared that the Chinese 
Government was now prioritizing HIV/AIDS. 
43  As with best practices in other countries, a multi-sectoral approach 
developed. The advantages of this lie in building habits of dialogue, coordinating 
policies and action, and building capacity beyond Health Departments to those of 
Agricultural, Education, and Transport. In seeking to seriously tackle issues of stigma 
and of access, Departments of Culture were required to promote HIV/AIDS 
awareness and prevention in entertainment areas, such as cinemas, theatres, sports and 
recreational facilities. Their initiatives included free condoms, clean syringes or 
methadone treatment44
   A highly sensitive sector in many countries in their fight against HIV/AIDS is that 
of the armed forces, militia, security, and police forces. There are two aspects to this. 
Firstly, as part of the HIV/AIDS problem, there is a need to tackle the sector as a 
source of infection. Clearly, with 2.5 million personnel in the People’s Liberation 
. Technical Institutes providing medical and family planning 
services were directed to provide counseling and to coordinate with employers. 
                                                 
42 Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Document (2004) No.7, <<国务院关
于切实加强艾滋病防治工作的通知>>[State Council Notice on Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention 
and Control], http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/fab/718174.htm. 
43 Government of People’s Republic of China, State Council Document (2004) No.7, ibid., Art.1. 
44 Agence France Presse, ‘Free condoms for Valentine cinemagoers in Shanghai’, March 2, 2004, 
China AIDS/HIV News Archive, http://www.utopia-asia.com/aidschi.htm. 
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Army alone, this is a significant sub-population group45.  In the mid-1990s blood 
products exported to Hong Kong from a business attached to a military hospital in 
Guangzhou tested positive for HIV and concern was expressed in a December 2000 
study of HIV/AIDS infections in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces in 
Yunnan. Consequently, all new recruits into the PLA have been tested for HIV and 
AIDS since 2001.46 Secondly, in its declared strategy goals, all security services at all 
levels and regions were included as part of the Government’s solution. The Public 
Security Bureau has the responsibility of countering criminal acts of sex and drug 
trafficking. But clearly there are substantial problems of systemic corruption and 
bribery. The influence of criminal gangs remains pervasive despite ‘strike hard 
campaigns’ [严打  Yanda]. 47
                                                 
45  UNAIDS Nordic Office, Engaging uniformed services in the fight against HIV/AIDS: China, 
http://uniformservices.unaids.org/country.asp?region=Asia and Pacific&country=China.  
 Moreover, there are issues here of operational 
competence with respect to HIV/AIDS. In particular, to what extent are police and 
security forces sufficiently competent to deal effectively and sympathetically with 
HIV-positive and AIDS sufferers? Do the personnel of such agencies possess the 
requisite knowledge, skills, counseling experience, to provide the protection, support, 
46 Chengdu Xinan Guofang Yiyao, ‘China Study Views HIV/AIDS in Yunnan Province, Impact on 
Troops’, Vol. 10(6), pp. 381-382, (Washington DC: FBIS CPP20010405000155, December 1, 2000); 
Partick Tyler, ‘China concedes blood serum contained AIDS virus’, New York Times, October 25, 
1997, p.A3; Wang Chicai, Zhang Xinsheng and Li Ying, ‘Impact on and Countermeasures against 
AIDS in the Chinese Military’, Renmin Junyi (2) [People’s Military Surgeon], (February 28, 1997), pp. 
64-65. 
47郑燕杰(Zheng Yanjie),‘海南省毒品违法犯罪情况调查分析 ’ [An Analysis of Drug Crime in 
Hainan Province] http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id=1347&l_class=4. 
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and ongoing care necessary to move beyond the narrow confines of a problem 
operationally understood in terms of the provisions of the criminal code?  
   These are ambitious objectives and, reflecting a sense of belated ‘catch-up’, seek to 
cover every aspect of the disease simultaneously. Inevitably, this stretches available 
financial, administrative, and human resource capacities beyond their limits; 
additional funds notwithstanding. 
   All authorities were required under the 2004 State Council Directive to provide 
educational publicity in their areas to reach all families. Despite problems of social 
stigma and criticism that sexual promiscuity was being encouraged, cooperation with 
producers of condoms was strengthened in order to promote a heightened awareness 
and practice of HIV/AIDS prevention.48
   What resulting outcomes can we identify? The most practical responses include 
Chinese ARV production cutting the cost of these drugs under Doha Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Properties (TRIPs) and the ‘Four Frees and One Care 
Policy’ that help to distribute them to the most in need. But even a glimpse at 
activities shows a breadth and depth of initiatives underway. The Government 
announced that, from 2004, there would be hard copy and online publication of 
notifiable diseases and public health emergencies. A national database of HIV/AIDS 
 There was also a substantial advance in the 
open acknowledgement in the State Council’s action strategy that drugs and shared 
needle use remain major contributing factors to China’s HIV/AIDS problem. Hence, a 
stronger regime capable of monitoring the use of needles in the health system as well 
as in illegal drugs was also envisaged. The political legacy of the Henan scandal led to 
regulated voluntary, unpaid blood donor units being created across work units and 
travel hubs. 
                                                 
48 Government of People’s Republic of China, State Council Document No.7, Art. 2. 
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sufferers was announced in March 2005 as only a small percentage of were registered 
with health authorities and disease centers only held detailed records for 4.2% of 
estimated sufferers. To facilitate clean and efficient blood testing, a Nucleic Acid 
Testing (NAT) Center was built with US collaboration in November 2003. There is 
now better training and information for medical workers at local level through 
Government and NGO programs and training centers. 
   A further outcome includes programs to address HIV/AIDS among the country’s 
prison population. China’s prison population is officially recorded at 1.5 million 
located in 670 publicly acknowledged jails. The testing of all existing and new 
inmates for HIV was announced in November 2004. Additionally, there is a 30% risk 
of MTCT in China and, as part of the ‘Four Frees and One Care’ [四免一关怀’政策], 
there is now a national campaign to support reduction of MTCT. A Henan Province 
pilot scheme run in 2001 has been extended nationally to 120 high risk areas and 
involves not only the provision of treatment medicines but also pre-marriage 
preventative health checks for couples. Similarly, prevention interventions include the 
creation of youth sexual health centers such as one of the earliest established in 
Qingdao in Shandong Province. Additionally, there are workplace initiatives such as 
the legal protection of employment rights for PLWA. Notable here was Suzhou in 
Jiangsu Province. In 2003, Suzhou was the first to pass a specific law guaranteeing 
PLWA rights of employment, education, and health care.  
   So there is a range of initiatives taking hold. But a major practical barrier to 
overcoming HIV/AIDS in China, as elsewhere, is stigma and social 
misunderstanding. A 2002 survey of 10 cities and 10 towns interviewed a random 
sample of 18-70 year-olds (some 6,777 people). They found that 93% city residents 
and 83% of town residents were aware of the virus but their knowledge of the three 
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main modes of transmission was lower at 73.4% and 62.5% respectively. Large 
numbers lacked knowledge about the effectiveness of condoms as means of protection 
low at 33.3% and 34.1%.49 But awareness is now improving with a huge societal 
effort. We can see a range of state and civil interventions including: sex education in 
schools; campaigns by celebrities; a China Family Planning Association awareness 
motorcade through Guangzhou in November 2004; HIV/AIDS themed plays for 
villagers in Shanxi Province with short productions performed on a mobile stage 
(some 20,000 villagers had been brought the HIV/AIDS message in this way by 
November 2004). Political leadership is a key feature of successful HIV/AIDS 
campaigns worldwide and high-profile visits by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and 
Vice-Premier Wu Yi to Henan Province AIDS villages in December 2003 and by 
President Hu Jintao to You’an Hospital in Beijing in December 2004 where he 
publicly shook hands with AIDS patients were important symbolic acts for the health 
community: ‘Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have set an example for the officials at all 
levels, and their personal visits to AIDS patients far more influential than issuing a 
host of paper instructions.’50
   Despite corruption and the influence of organized crime syndicates, the Government 
is seeking to counter the flow of illicit narcotics into China from the Golden Triangle. 
This is evidenced by the 2004 strike hard campaign against drug dealers and users in 
which 5,000 dealers were arrested, 250 gangs broken up, and 5,000 kilograms of 
drugs confiscated. This was followed by a Spring 2005 campaign called by Minister 
 
                                                 
49 People’s Daily, ‘Survey Finds AIDS Awareness Still Low in China’, September 23, 2002, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/23/print20020923_103691.html. 
50 Jin Jun (Director, China HIV/AIDS Policy Research Center) December 2004, Xinhua, ‘Anti-AIDS 
Commitment Translated into Actions’, December 1, 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/ English/China/ 
113770.htm. 
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of Public Security, Zhou Yongkang, a ‘people’s war’. The fight is coordinated via the 
National Commission for Narcotics Control, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry 
of Justice. Penalties include death for dealers and there is addiction rehabilitation 
through compulsory rehabilitation centers and ‘drug rehabilitation through education 
and labor’ units.51
   If IDU is one key transmission mode being addressed, specific challenges of sex 
work and wider issues of gender are also steadily being engaged in a variety of ways. 
For example, the employment of peer education among female sex workers is proving 
successful as sex workers are trained to pass on their HIV/AIDS knowledge to other 
workers. Wider gender challenges in a hypermasculinised
 These are narrow countervailing measures. But the Government is 
now beginning to adopt a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach involving 
reducing harm by opening methadone clinics across China to treat addicts. There were 
100 open by the end of 2005 and 1,000-1,500 more are due to open by 2009. There 
are also a number of clean needle exchange programs developing. 
52
                                                 
51 Drew Thompson, ‘The People’s War’ against Drugs and HIV/AIDS’, China Brief, Vol.5(14), The 
Jamestown Foundation, (June 21, 2005), p.2. 
 social culture include 
slave wives. In 2001, there were executions of human traffickers who sold women 
from Chongqing to gangs in Inner Mongolia and Shangxi Province. More intractable 
are problems of domestic violence and marital rape. But even here there are some 
small signs of change and improvement. The Maple Women’s Psychological 
Counseling Center in Beijing reports more women stepping forward to report attacks 
and more willing to take the cases to court. This suggests that the legal system, 
hitherto largely hesitant or unwilling to act in this respect, is becoming slightly more 
open to assisting in practice. 
52 L. Ling’s concept of ‘hypermasculinity’, quoted in Neil Renwick, ‘The “Nameless Fever”: the 
HIV/AIDS Pandemic and China’s Women’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.23(2), (2002), pp.377-393. 
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   Of course, all HIV/AIDS interventions cost money. There had been three funding 
priorities in the 1999-2003 period: (1) blood safety; health education and intervention; 
and surveillance and testing. In severely hit provinces, the share allocated to treatment 
and care was necessarily higher. The central government claims that, under the new 
program, financial support would be substantial enough to underpin this program. It 
was to be adequate to provide the necessary ARV drugs to treat HIV/AIDS patients. 
More funding was to be given to further ARV research and development. How 
realistic were these financial claims? On balance, the evidence available supports the 
Government’s claims. A December 2005 report on youth development confirmed 
greater funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and response with 1.2 billion Yuan 
(US$148 billion) expended over the two-year period 2003-2004. 53 The December 
2004 SCAWC/UN Theme Group also confirmed a decisive shift. An initial 120 
million Yuan (approximately US$15 million) special funding was allocated to 
HIV/AIDS by Central Government. In 2003, it added another 270 million Yuan 
(approximately US$35 million) to provide for free anti-retroviral (ARV) treatment in 
the seriously infected areas. In 2004, the total HIV/AIDS budget was 870 million 
Yuan (US$108 million).54
   Under the current strategic plan, there is to be full social support to families affected 
by the disease, for instance provision for free education of orphans caused by the 
disease. Other necessary forms of social support to affected individuals and families 
must be provided and the finances made available from the general state finance 
 
                                                 
53 China Youth and Children Research Center/China Communist Youth League, (Beijing, CYCRC, 
December 2005), http://english.people.com.cn/200512/28/print20051228_231288.html. 
54 ‘ 中 国 艾 滋 病 防 治 工 作 ’ (China HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control), http://www. 
china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/fab/718174.htm. 
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budget. 55  More (and more effective) campaigns against social stigma have been 
required. Anyone responsible for deliberately spreading the disease or false reporting 
on the extent of the disease is liable to severe punishment.56 But there are obvious 
human rights dangers with this issue of disclosure and criminalization of aspects of 
the HIV/AIDS problem here. For example, according to Shanghai University’s Deng 
Weizhi, despite amendments to the Marriage Law in 2001, the issue of marital rape 
remains legally ambiguous: ‘To better protect women’s rights, a clear judicial 
explanation needs to be made on rape within marriage’57
   However, decisions taken by the organs of central government in Beijing can only 
be effective in fighting the challenge of HIV/AIDS by realizing genuine commitment 
and action at the provincial and local tiers of government. If part of the longer-term 
problem of developing a major response to this disease in China has been a 
questionable commitment and a delay in joining-up the various agencies of the central 
state, then a more recent obstacle was an ambiguous response by provincial, 
municipal, and local authorities. 
 and, one might add, on the 
resulting uneven judicial treatment. Moreover, who is to determine, on what criteria, 
and with what degree of transparency, just what is ‘false’ reporting of the extent of the 
disease? The potential for mal-administration or outright abuse is clear. 
   What then are the key factors operating at the provincial and county levels? There 
are two principal factors we are able to consider here. The first factor is 
administrative. Assessments of the practical pursuit of the national goals in the face of 
                                                 
55  Government of People’s Republic of China, State Council Document No.7, Art.5. (Beijing: 
Information Office of the State Council, 2004). 
56 Government of People’s Republic of China, State Council Document No.7, Art.6. 
57  Wang Ying, ‘More and more women saying no to abusers’, Chinadaily.com, http:// 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/03/content_311452.htm. 
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HIV/AIDS are mixed. The key point is made by Edmund Settle (Program 
Coordinator, China HIV/AIDS Information Network in Beijing) that ‘top policy 
makers fully understand the long term economic and political importance of 
preventing a wide-spread HIV epidemic; however, at the local level, leaders often 
deny or don’t view HIV/AIDS as a priority in their areas’.58
   A core concern here is capacity building and bureaucratic awareness. Professor Jin 
Wei from the Central Party School who runs the School’s HIV/AIDS policy education 
program points out: “To many students (the Party’s middle and high-ranking 
officials), such matters should be the business of the Ministry of Health and have little 
to do with them”. Professor Jin Wei argues that many officials remain unaware of the 
1998 Long and Medium Term Programs or knowledge of the five-year Action Plan [
《中国预防与控制艾滋病中长期规划（1998-2010）》与 《中国遏制与防治艾滋病行
动计划（2001-2005）》].
  
59 The Government’s priority is to train these officials at 
various administrative levels. Mao Qunan, a spokesperson from the Ministry of 
Health, points out the strategic objective involved in incubating and placing Beijing’s 
own personnel into local government: ‘The reason (for the stress on training) is very 
simple: it is these officials who put the central government’s political commitment on 
HIV/AIDS control into practice.’60
                                                 
58 Government of People’s Republic of China, State Council Document No.7, p. 15. 
 
59 刘鉴强 (Liu Jianqiang), ‘中央党校里的艾滋观念交锋’ [The Argument about the HIV/AIDS Issue 
in the Central Party School], 南 方 周 末  (Southern Weekend) (June 23, 2005), p.6; 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20050623/xw/szxw2/200506230026.asp. 
60  Zhang Feng, ‘Party school raises AIDS awareness’, China Daily  December 14, 2004, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/14/content_400143.htm.  
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   The second factor is financial. The Central Government’s funds are managing to 
flow into targeted provinces and counties in significant amounts. The priorities are 
naturally those with the highest levels of PLWA. In 2003, 60% of Beijing’s funding 
went to nine Provinces and 50% of all funding concentrated in only the five worst-hit 
Provinces (Henan, Sichuan, Anhui, Hubei and Yennan). In addition, in 2004 Yunnan 
and Henan were designated priority areas for financial and technical support by the 
Ministry of Health in Beijing with 11 million Yuan (US$ 1.4 million) per year 
specifically dedicated to each of these two priority areas.61
   In 2003, provincial and county governments across China contributed 179 million 
Yuan (US$22.2 million) to HIV/AIDS prevention and care. The average Provincial 
allocation was 3.36 million Yuan (US$417,000). There was a 53% increase in County 
government expenditures in 2003. Yunnan’s Provincial Government in Kunming 
pledged 520 million Yuan (US$65 million) over 5-10 years to counter the disease. 
The money is to be spent on methadone treatment for IDUs; free condoms for AIDS 
families; and condom vending machines installed in public facilities. Patient 
confidentiality restrictions were to be placed on medical staff and institutions. 
 
 
The Culture of HIV/AIDS Governance: Civil Society 
One of the central arguments of this paper is that the fight against HIV/AIDS can only 
be successful if there is full engagement between government, civil society, and 
international agencies; that is, there is a qualitative integrity to the humane 
governance of HIV/AIDS characterized by transparency, accountability, mutuality, 
and reciprocity. Certainly, civil society (or ‘third department’ as it is termed in China) 
                                                 
61 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office/UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, 2005 
Update, p.22. 
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is growing in significance on certain issues in the changing Chinese political culture. 
Tsinghua University’s Wang Ming argues:  
the third department, civil society, NGO, NPO [Non-Profit Organisation] they 
all mean the same kind of social organization in China i.e. independent from the 
government and the market system … China’s NGO sector has gained more 
attention recently in HIV and public health, for example, the government is 
investing a huge amount of money in preventing and controlling HIV… but 
there are big limitations on government intervention and therefore it is better 
through NGO action on some issues. Nowadays Wu Yi and Minister of Health 
Gao Chiang have called on many occasions for more involvement of NGOs in 
public health.62
   This paper’s argument that civil society is closely related to issues of humane 
governance is not particularly novel. For example, observers such as Harvard Law 
School’s Joan Kaufman have also argued this position.
 
63
                                                 
62  ‘王名：中国第三部门之路 ’ [Wang Ming: China’s Third Department], February 5, 2006, 
http://www.szhx.org.cn/model/listnews.aspx?id=5&a0=239261. 
 HIV/AIDS is no longer only 
an epidemiological issue or a development issue. It is also an issue of human rights. 
As we have already noted, the continuing stigmatization of people affected by HIV 
and AIDS is an obvious problem here. Stigma arises from fear of the unknown and 
the different. A lack of understanding about the virus promotes discrimination, a 
closure of the discursive community, and acts as a major break on China’s ability to 
tackle HIV/AIDS successfully. In a 2002 survey undertaken in four large Chinese 
63 Joan Kaufman, Visiting Scholar, East Asia Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, Testimony 
to Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Roundtable ‘HIV/AIDS in China: Can 
Disaster Be Averted?’ September 9, 2002, cited in CECC, 2003 Annual Report: HIV/AIDS, SARS, and 
Public Health in China, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/soc/healthannr ept03.php?. 
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cities, 75% of interviewees said that they would avoid people infected with 
HIV/AIDS and 45% believed that the disease was a consequence of moral 
degeneration. 64  People affected by HIV/AIDS have been shunned by family and 
friends, been excluded by their communities, lost their jobs, and even been refused 
hospital treatment.65
   But problems of discrimination persist. In political terms, China’s record is 
distinctly equivocal and, at best, sends out contradictory signals. In 2003 Human 
Rights Watch reported police violence against HIV-positive protesters in the ‘Aids 
villages’ of Henan Province; websites are blocked; there has been episodic harassment 
of leading civil society activists.
 The Government in Beijing has responded with legal protection 
against HIV/AIDS discrimination, national education and awareness campaigns, and 
highly publicized visits of China’s leaders and popular celebrities to HIV/AIDS 
patients. These initiatives have been buttressed at provincial and local levels by 
Municipal Government anti-discrimination legislation and policy initiatives and civil 
organizational initiatives to raise awareness (sometimes in conjunction with 
international agencies and private foundations).   
66
                                                 
64 China Social Survey referred to in UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS: China’s Titanic Peril (Geneva: UNAIDS, 
2002) and also in avert.org: HIV & AIDS in China (October 2005), http://www.avert.org/ 
aidschina.htm.  
 If the SARS outbreak carried any societal message 
65 Human Rights Watch, Locked Doors: The Human Rights of People Living With HIV/AIDS in China, 
Vol.15(7) (New York: HRW, August 2003).  
66  Human Rights Watch, ‘对中国艾滋活动人士的限制’  [Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China], 
Vol.17(95)(C), (June 10, 2005), New York, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/china0605; Human Rights 
Watch, ‘中国：终止对公民社会在抗击艾滋病时所设的限制’ [China: End Restrictions on Civil 
Society in Fight Against AIDS], (Hong Kong, June 15, 2005), 
http://hrw.org/chinese/docs/2005/06/14/china11138_txt.htm.  
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for the culture of governance, then it was to demonstrate the limits of opaque 
governance and the need to ensure public understanding to gain their support.67
   In this latter respect, inter-connected issues of HIV/AIDS, sexual identity, and 
human rights remain highly sensitive in China. They are deeply rooted in the 
character of the political culture as a whole not only social cultural mores and, 
consequently, may prove more intractable to overcome in the short and medium 
terms. In 2004, a more constructive approach to homosexuality was emerging in some 
provinces. For example, working with the USAID program, the province of 
Heilongjiang launched a Gay Aids survey to help fight the disease.
  
68  Yet in 
December 2005, two days before the opening of the first Beijing Gay and Lesbian 
Culture Festival (which included an HIV/AIDS awareness program), the Beijing 
Public Security Bureau banned organizers from using a public space and, with the 
festival moved to a private venue, uniformed and plainclothes police raided the bar 
and shut down the event.   Human Rights Watch’s Scott Long responded that: ‘China 
continues to talk about political reform, but closing down a cultural event is a crude 
reminder of the limits on openness. This police raid was an effort to drive China’s gay 
and lesbian communities underground and to silence open discussions about sexuality 
throughout the country.’69
                                                 
67 Melissa Curley and Nicholas Thomas, ‘Human Security and Public Health in Southeast Asia: the 
SARS Outbreak’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.58(1), (March 2004), pp.17-32. 
 The political costs of such crass exclusionary culture and 
stigmatized practice can be significant. Recognition of this was eventually evident 
68 BBC News Online, ‘China launches Gay Aids Survey’, July 26, 2004, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/asi 
a-pacific/3927487.stm. 
69 Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Police Shut Down Gay, Lesbian Event − Government Persecutes 
Civil Society Groups That Address HIV/AIDS’, Human Rights News, December 20, 2005, http:// 
hrw.org/english/ docs/2005/12/20/china 12328.htm.  
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during the SARS crisis with public anger and political calculation leading to the 
dismissal of China’s then Health Minister Zhang Wenkang and Beijing’s Mayor 
Meng Xuenong on 20 April, 2003. But, according to some post-SARS reports, HIV 
sufferers remain subject not only to stigmatized exclusion but there were claims of 
outright violence in provinces such as Henan, leading to a group of HIV/AIDS 
practitioners and activists writing to President Hu Jintao in August 2003 that: ‘The 
harassment of people with HIV/AIDS and their advocates diminishes China’s ability 
to halt its AIDS epidemic.’ 70  Subsequent high profile public meetings between 
China’s leadership and prominent AIDS activists may well have been Beijing’s 
response to such disquiet. Yet, in February 2006, harassment of health activists was 
still alleged to persist at local levels.71
 
 
Global-national engagement 
To what extent is the character of China’s HIV/AIDS governance now related to 
global HIV/AIDS and health governance networks? China’s global HIV/AIDS 
engagement has three dimensions: (1) the development of global principles and 
strategic norms; (2) operational capacity building; and (3) financial assistance. Global 
HIV/AIDS principles are based upon the 1988 London Declaration on AIDS 
Prevention and June 2001 UNGASS United Nations Declaration Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS. To these we can add the sixth goal of the September 2000 Millennium 
Development Goals to halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. 
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   From these principles there developed a UN System Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS 
2001-2005 and the so-called “three ones” — three guiding principles for national 
authorities and partners for one agreed action framework; one national AIDS 
authority; and one national monitoring and evaluation system. These are framed by an 
array of additional health-specific and more generic normative regimes. The WHO’s 
International Health Rules are examples of the former. Examples of the latter are, of 
course, global declarations on the human rights of women and girls; domestic 
violence; marriage ages; reproductive rights; labor protection against stigmatized 
abuse and exploitation; economic, cultural, and social rights; declarations against 
human and narcotics trafficking.  
   Since UNGASS 2001, there has been an explicit shift away from framing non-state 
organizational participation in terms of “consultation” to stress “partnership” with 
general and specialist NGOs, business, and labor. Reflecting this, capacity building to 
translate declaratory goals into practical reality has brought together inter-
governmental organizations with a host of civil societal and corporate agencies. The 
need for a coordinating administrative hub spurred a 1994 UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) Resolution to establish a dedicated program and lead agency72
                                                 
72 United Nations, Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/2, 21st Plenary Meeting, July 3, 
1995, http://www.unaids.org/en/other/functionalities/viewdocument.asp? . 
 
resulting in The Joint Program on AIDS (UNAIDS) established in 1996. Coordination 
with agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Unicef and the 
International Labor Organization overlaps with other hubs such as the World 
Economic Forum, G-8, or European and African Unions; with global NGO networks 
such as the Global Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS (GNP+); and with 
philanthropic bodies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Elton John 
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Foundation, and Clinton Foundation. Capacity-building embraces almost every aspect 
of life, but particular targets have been the development of global and national 
surveillance and monitoring; ARV provision and treatment, health worker training 
and support, counseling skills development and sustainability, and educational 
awareness programs. In January 2006, The Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative negotiated 
new pricing agreements to lower the prices of HIV diagnostic tests and two ARVs by 
30-50%. The agreements are expected to benefit 50 countries.73
   The third element of the global response is funding. Governments, philanthropists 
and civil society organizations fund the fight through public and private, multilateral, 
bilateral, national and societal pathways. The most prominent multilateral global 
response is that of the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
established in 2002. The Global Fund was set up to provide a focal point for 
commitments by members of the system and to publicly track compliance. By 
December 2003, the Fund had disbursed US$2.1 billion to 121 countries with 
approximately 60% allocated to HIV/AIDS. Yet annual funding targets are set at 
US$7-10 billion. States have made significant pledges but these were likely to decline 
steadily by 2007. However, the eventual confirmation of the US pledge for 2004 of 
US$547 million raised the funds available for the 4th Round of grants in June 2004 to 
at least US$900 million. A global ‘replenishment’ conference was then organized in 
London in September 2005 to address this problem of apparent “donor fatigue” with 
renewed commitments once again being declared. At the conference, the 29 donors 
attending pledged US$3.7 billion for the two-year period 2006-2007. This represents 
 
                                                 
73 William J. Clinton Foundation, Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative, Press Release: New Agreements to 
Lower Prices of HIV/AIDS Rapid Tests and Second-line Drugs, January 12, 2006, 
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half the US$7 billion total resource needs for the Fund for this period but more funds 
were understood to be forthcoming in 2006 and a follow-up conference was 
timetabled for June 2006 to gain more pledges74
   A second notable funding source of scale is that of President Bush’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) established in January 2003.
. The delivery and funding gap for the 
Global Fund remains a major problem given the estimated annual funding 
requirements.  
7
   As noted above, the third significant funding sources are private philanthropic 
organizations with the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative and Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation prominent. In 1999, the Gates’ Foundation contributed US$2 million to 
the China Foundation to support a China Basic Health Services Project. It also 
supported the China Academy of Health Policy with US$100,000 for a project in 
2001 researching health policy development. 
5 US$15 billion is being 
provided over 5 years (including US$10 billion in new funding). There are 15 focus 
countries and it is driven by the so-called ‘2-7-10’ Program Goals — namely, to treat 
2 million with ARVs; prevent 7 million infections; provide care and support for 10 
million adults and orphans living with HIVAIDS. Prima facie this is a major advance. 
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   China’s national response is heavily enmeshed within the global HIV/AIDS regime 
with all its potential normative weight for change at the national level of governance. 
It has permeated the Chinese national HIV/AIDS response in terms of policy 
prescription, capacity-building and financing. The first of these is evident in the 
translation of the ‘three ones’ into policy by the Chinese Government. There is now 
one agreed action framework; one national AIDS authority; and one national 
monitoring and evaluation system. The second aspect of the global-national 
governance nexus is the engagement of global and national civil societal agencies in 
collaborative primary and palliative care capacity building. The notion of partnerships 
was slow to take hold. This is no longer the case. International dialogue has again 
been influential. For example, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) is 
working with the National Working Committee for Women and Children and the All-
China Women’s Federation to enhance protection for women against HIV/AIDS and 
other infectious diseases. In addition, a host of private agencies such as the Ford 
Foundation; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; Macfarlane Burnet Center for 
Medical Research Response Project in Tibet and Marie Stopes International are all 
actively engaged in the country. The agencies are not working in isolation from one 
another, being linked through CHAIN (China HIV/AIDS Information Network) 
online and through a German Government (CIM) assisted promotional leaflet. 
   The initiatives arising from these partnerships are multi-sectoral and multi-tiered in 
character. They include, for example, a business-Government dialogue sponsored by 
Harvard University’s Center for Business and Government in November 2003; the 
signing by the Government of an agreement with the Clinton Foundation in April 
2004 to facilitate on-going technical cooperation with China’s Center for Disease 
Prevention and Control and Chinese Academy of Medical Science; the China-UK 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project; a Yunnan-Australian Red Cross Societies 
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HIV/AIDS youth peer project; an Australian Government (AusAID) five-year (2002-
2007) A$21 (US$15.8 million) prevention and care project in Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region; a US Global Aids Program (GAP) contributes to the China-US 
Co-operation on Prevention and Care for HIV/AIDS Project and to HIV/AIDS control 
strategies preventing secondary transmission through voluntary counseling and 
testing; the World AIDS Foundation supports various training projects; Population 
Services International assists the Chinese Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and 
Control in a condom promotion program in Guangdong.    
   The third element, that of funding, is also critical and we have seen a scaling up by 
the Chinese Government but also by international donors multilaterally and 
bilaterally. Again, the global regime’s role is significant. According to 2005 Update, 
the ‘international community’ has committed about US$275 million to China’s fight 
against HIV/AIDS in donations by 2005. In 2003 and 2004 alone, some US$87.5 
million were committed internationally to China. The World Bank provides loans for 
two projects totaling US$160 million for enhanced prevention and care (China Nine 
Health Project and China Disease Prevention Project); the Dutch Government 
finances Save The Children Fund projects in Yunnan and also contributes to the 
Unicef Mekong Project. Moreover, the Global Fund has committed US$98 million for 
HIV/AIDS. Whilst China’s relations with multilateral agencies are now established 
strengthening, a central role continues to be played by bilateral assistance. The US’s 
GAP is run through the Centre for Disease Control (CDC). CDC is contributing 
US$15 million to China-US Cooperation on Prevention and Care for HIV/AIDS 
Project. Overall, the US has pledged US$35 million over the 5 years to 2008 for joint 
projects in China. Also, USAID provided US$7 million to Yunnan and Guangxi for 
counter-HIV program. By November 2004, the German Government had donated or 
loaned almost Euro 177 million (US$214 million) with an additional 50 million Euros 
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(US$60.5 million) pledged. The Australian government funds a needle exchange 
scheme in Guangxi costing US$7.38 million.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
At the heart of humane governance lie ‘horizons of aspiration’. The HIV/AIDS policy 
challenge for humane governance is multi-faceted. The virus spreads through a series 
of intersecting and mutually reinforcing conditions entwined with socio-economic and 
cultural transition. The interwoven linkages between the spread of the HIV virus and 
socio-economic development may be deconstructed through the provision of socio-
economic rights and more carefully targeted and managed transition policies. It must 
also be fought through the complex technical, financial and policy interplay between 
national and global regimes. But, as Harvard’s John Ruggie commented in November 
2003: ‘unless China acts decisively, it will find itself on an African trajectory, just 15 
years behind. In Africa, governments and businesses are looking back at what they 
should and could have done — in China, there is still time to avert the worst-case 
scenario.’76
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